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Abstract
This article documents a delay in the public release of Mexican international
reserve data in the months before Mexico’s debt crisis at the end of 1994. The
article establishes that in that year investors did not know the level of Mexican
reserves before October; yet this lack of information did not seem to reduce
investor conﬁdence in the Mexican economy. The article does not establish
whether the delay in releasing reserve data was due to logistical problems or to a
government strategy. The possibility that the delay was strategic is evaluated by
developing an economic model that captures some of the principal constraints
facing the Mexican government in 1994 and that makes explicit the conﬂicting
objectives of the government and investors. The model shows that in such an
environment with private information, strategic delay can occur in equilibrium if
investors are uncertain about the cause of the delay.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Afterseveral yearsofstrongeconomic performance,Mex-
ico suddenly suffered a ﬁnancial crisis at the end of 1994.
Within one month, the value of the peso fell by more than
35 percent and Mexican international reserves were de-
pleted to the point that default on dollar-indexed sovereign
debt looked imminent. One issue that has surfaced since
the crisis is whether the government strategically delayed
the release of data on its holdings of international reserves
in the months before the crisis. Why are international re-
serves signiﬁcant? From the perspective of investors, the
stock of international reserves provides valuable informa-
tion about the expected return on their investments. Inves-
tors may construe a low stock of international reserves as
bad newsthat signals animpending devaluation ora possi-
ble default on sovereign debt, and they may choose to liq-
uidate their holdings of Mexican securities. In this article,
we document that there was bad news about Mexican in-
ternational reserves in 1994 and that the public release of
this news was, in fact, delayed. We contend that this delay
was within the range of the market’s expectation based on
its experience with Mexican reporting practices, but that
the delay might have been an equilibrium strategic deci-
sionbyMexicanpolicymakersinanenvironmentwithpri-
vate information.
To show that the release of reserve data was delayed,
we consider the various channels used to convey data to
the public and show that there was delay in each of these
channels. While this evidence makes a compelling case
that there were delays, it does not make clear whether
these delays were due to logistical problems or were stra-
tegic decisions to withhold bad news.
Toevaluatethepossibilitythatdelayswerestrategic,we
develop a model that captures some of the principal con-
straintsfacingtheMexicangovernmentandthatmakesex-
plicit the conﬂicting objectives of the government and for-
eign investors. Our model shows that strategic delay can
occur in equilibrium as long as lenders are uncertain about
the cause of the delay.
The Facts
Bad News
Here we document that there was bad news about Mexi-
can international reserves in 1994.
Again,dataoninternationalreservesarevaluabletofor-
eign holders of Mexican securities. Historically, decisions
to devalue currencies have often been preceded by a large
decline in the stock of international reserves. Debt crises
have also typically been prompted by an inability of a gov-
ernment to come up with the foreign reserves necessary to
meet obligations denominated in international currencies
such as the dollar.
1 In the recent Mexican crisis, a lack of
sufficient international reserves to meet outstanding short-
term government obligations seems to have led to the de-
cision to devalue the peso and then, somewhat later, to the
U.S. government’s decision in January 1995 to offer Mex-
ico ﬁnancial aid.
In February 1994, Mexican international reserves had
risen to record levels with the new investment that
followed the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). International reserves stood at almost $30 bil-
lion, an amount nearly double the size of the monetary
base. Chart 1 shows that by the end of April, however, re-
serves had fallen by $10 billion. Signiﬁcant events pre-
cededthisdropinreserves.Increasesinshort-termU.S.in-
terest rates starting in February and the assassination in
March of the presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio
led many investors to sell pesos and buy dollars. Joint ef-
forts by the Mexican and U.S. governments ﬁnally stabi-
lized the outﬂow of funds and the resulting loss of inter-
national reserves to a level of about $17 billion. Among
those efforts: Mexico raised short-term rates and let the
peso fall from the top to the bottom of its target range,
while the United States announced a new line of credit for
Mexico of $6 billion in April. International reserves re-
mained essentially stable until June, when the Mexican
secretary of the interior, Jorge Carpizio, submitted his res-
ignation due to irregularities in the way the polling for the
presidential election was being organized. After he with-
drewhisresignation,Mexicaninternationalreservesrecov-
ered in July and August.
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ThenextsigniﬁcanteventthataffectedreservesinMex-
ico occurred in September, when Jose Francisco Ruiz
Massieu, the secretary general of the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party, was assassinated.
3 Reserves fell in Septem-
ber but rose again in October to ﬁnally stabilize at a level
of more than $17 billion.
That level of reserves might seem adequate to have met
Mexico’s obligations, since those reserves exceeded the
stock of the monetary base. However, the Mexican gov-
ernment took other actions during the year which suggest
that reserves might not have been adequate. In April, the
Mexican government started borrowing heavily in the Te-
sobono market. Tesobonos are dollar-indexed, short-term
government debt securities. At the start of 1994, outstand-
ingTesobonoobligationswereonly$2billion.BySeptem-
ber, however, they had risen to more than $20 billion. Be-
cause of these government debt securities, international re-
serves were too low in September 1994 to meet Mexico’s
obligations. (See Cole and Kehoe 1996.)
Throughout 1994, the United States put pressure on
Mexico to devalue. This pressure increased in October,
when the United States said that it would not extend cred-
it to cover a shortfall in Mexico’s international reserves.
This pressure, plus a continued gradual erosion of interna-
tional reserves, ultimately led the Mexican government to
attempt a 14 percent devaluation on December 20. The
new target could not be sustained, and within ﬁve business
days, the peso’s value per U.S. dollar fell from 3.4 to 5.4
pesos. Following these events, the Tesobono market col-
lapsed.Investorschosetoredeemtheirholdingsratherthan
roll them over. Even with a ﬂoating peso, international re-
serves continued to hemorrhage. In January 1995, with the
Mexican government on the verge of default on these obli-
gations, the U.S. government produced its ﬁnancial aid
package.
Delayed Release
So there was quite a bit of bad news about Mexican inter-
national reserves during 1994. Now we show that the re-
lease of this bad news to the public was delayed.
BeforethemostrecentMexicancrisis,dataonMexican
reserves were publicly released in two ways. One was di-
rectly from the Mexican government to the public; three
officialannouncementsaboutMexicanreservesweremade
each year. The other was indirectly; the Mexican govern-
ment reported data on Mexican reserves to the Internation-
al Monetary Fund (IMF), which published them monthlyinitsInternationalFinancialStatistics(IFS).During1994,
both an official announcement about reserves and the re-
porting of reserves to the IMF were delayed.
For many years before 1994, the Mexican government
announced its total reserve data three times a year: ﬁrst, in
the Bank of Mexico’s annual report (issued in the spring);
second, at the Mexican Banking Association conference
(usually held in the summer); and, ﬁnally, in the presi-
dent’s State of the Union address (given on November 1).
The tradition was broken in 1994. The Bank of Mexi-
co’s report for 1993 was issued at the beginning of April.
It contained reserve data for 1993, but no data for 1994.
No further official announcements on reserves were made
until the Mexican Banking Association conference was
held on October 19, 1994. At this conference, Mexico’s
reserves as of October 19 were announced. It was unusual
for the banking conference to be held as late as the middle
of October. In 1992 and 1993, the conference was held in
late August and early September, respectively. Since, by
law, the State of the Union address must be given on
November 1, the banking conference could not have been
held much later than it was in 1994. In the State of the
Union address on November 1, reserves as of October 31,
1994, were announced. This ﬁgure was not substantially
different from the ﬁgure announced at the banking confer-
ence two weeks earlier.
Mexico also delayed reporting international reserves to
the IMF in 1994. In the three years before 1994, Mexico’s
international reserve data for April were published in the
September IFS, and June reserve data were published in
the November IFS. In contrast, in 1994, the September
IFS contained only data through March 1994, and new da-
ta on reserves were not published until December. Since
noofficialannouncementsofMexico’s1994reserveswere
made until October 19, before that date, the releases to the
IMF were the only data available on reserves in 1994.
If Mexico had never previously delayed either its offi-
cialannouncementat thebankingconferenceor itsdatare-
ports to the IMF, then the delays in 1994 could almost cer-
tainly have been interpreted as an attempt to withhold bad
news.However,wenotesomerandomvariationinthetim-
ing of both the banking conference and the IMF reports.
During the years 1989–92, the banking conference was
usually held in August. However, in 1993, as we have
seen, the conference was held in the ﬁrst week of Septem-
ber. And in 1991, the conference was held in the ﬁrst
week of October. Thus, the 1994 conference was later than
in earlier years, but not much later than in 1991.
From the beginning of 1989 until September 1994, the
IMFusuallypublishedMexicaninternationalreserveswith
a lag of about ﬁve months. However, there were signiﬁ-
cant random variations in this lag. By November 1994, the
lag in publishing reserves in IFS was eight months. How-
ever, a longer lag had occurred once before: in the sum-
mer of 1993, reserves were published with a lag of eleven
months. When the data were ﬁnally released in 1993, they
showed an increase in reserves. So past Mexican releases
of reserve data through IFS might have convinced a rea-
sonable investor that the delays in the fall of 1994 were
only logistical delays and not worth worrying about.
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No Leaks or Lack of Conﬁdence
If the level of Mexico’s reserves could have been easily
guessed from other information, then neither Mexico’s
standard practice of releasing data three times a year nor
the apparent delays in releasing data in 1994 would have
hadmuchofaneffectoninvestors’decisions.Butpressac-
countsstronglysuggestthatinvestorsdidnotknowthelev-
el of Mexico’s reserves when they made their investment
decisions between April and October of 1994, when they
continued to show conﬁdence in the Mexican economy.
When Mexican and U.S. officials met in Washington,
D.C., to arrange for emergency ﬁnancing in the spring of
1994, they held a press conference, on April 26. During
this press conference, Mexican officials were asked about
the current level of international reserves, but the officials
would not disclose it. According to one report, “When
someone asked [Mexican Finance Minister Pedro Aspe]
how [the lending agreement] would affect the level of
Mexico’s reserves, he refused, point-blank, to say how
much Mexico had in reserves. He said . . . that the central
bankwasnowindependent:yetherefusedtolet[Governor
of the Bank of Mexico Miguel] Mancera answer” (Latin
American Newsletters, Ltd., 1994a, p. 1).
Press reports speculating about Mexico’s reserves at
that time show that leaks did not fully inform investors
about the state of reserves. For example, the New York
Times reported in April that “the Bank of Mexico’s own
foreign capital reserves are reported to exceed $25 billion”
(DePalma 1994, p. D1).
5 Reserves were actually less than
$18 billion when this article was published.
Information about reserves was so scanty that when the
levelofreserveswasannouncedonOctober19,anotherre-
port said, “The Banco de Mexico ﬁnally came clean. On
19 October the governor of the central bank, Miguel Man-
cera, revealed that Mexico’s reserves had fallen to US
$17.2 [billion] in mid-October. This means that since the
end of 1993 the reserves have fallen by 29%....T h esub-
stantial decline in reserves shows how nervous [interna-
tional ﬁnanciers] have become ....T h erisk of investing
in Mexico is rising sharply” (Latin American Newsletters,
Ltd., 1994b, p. 1).
Before October, the lack of information about Mexican
reserves did not diminish foreign investor conﬁdence fol-
lowingtheColosioassassinationinMarch1994.Thestron-
gest evidence of this is provided by data on net portfolio




negative in the fourth quarter, when bad news about Mexi-
can reserves was announced.
Continued investor conﬁdence in the second and the
third quarters of 1994 suggests that the delays documented
above were not interpreted as a clear signal of bad news.
Implications of Delay
Without public statements from current or former Mexi-
can officials, we cannot know whether the delays we have
documented were strategic or logistical. To make a case
that delays could have been strategic, however, we devel-
op an economic model. One feature of our model is that
a delay for whatever reason can have bad implications for
a country. Here we justify that modeling assumption.By 1994, Mexico and other Latin American countries
were dependent on new sources for international capital:
mutual fund managers and other foreign securities inves-
tors. Between 1989 and 1992, 40 percent of all new for-
eign investment in Latin America came from securities in-
vestors, up from 15 percent between 1977 and 1981. In
contrast, commercial banks provided 14 percent of new
LatinAmericaninvestmentbetween1989and1992,down
from 67 percent in 1977–81.
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Mutual funds largely ﬁlled the investment vacuum
caused by many banks’ unwillingness to lend to Latin
American countries after the banks’ large Latin American
debt losses in the mid-1980s. But mutual fund investment
in Mexico and other countries brought with it a price: a
demand for short-term performance. In the past, foreign
banks had been rather patient in their lending. But mutual
fund managers brought the same demands to Latin Ameri-
can ﬁnance ministers that they had brought to U.S. compa-
nies: perform now, or the money is gone. Mutual fund
managers recognized that their investors dump underper-
forming funds quickly; they do not stick around for long-
term results. (See Goetzmann, Greenwald, and Huberman
1992.)
In 1993, for instance, international mutual fund manag-
ers invested heavily in Turkish stocks and bonds. After an
Islamic political party won some municipal elections in
early 1994, the Turkish lira and the dollar value of the
Turkish stock market plummeted. As a result, many mon-
ey managers sold their Turkish asset holdings. (See Torres
and Vogel 1994.) Investment inﬂows then stopped. (See
June 1996 IFS.)
Given such experience, in Turkey and other emerging
markets, Mexican officials had good reason to be con-
cernedthatreleasing badnewsaboutinternational reserves
could have a substantial effect on foreign investment.
The Model
Abovewehavedocumentedthattherewasbadnewsabout
international reserves and that the release of this bad news
was delayed. However, this delay seems to be within the
range of the market’s expectations based on its experience
withMexicanreportingpractices.Nowwepresentamodel
which demonstrates that the Mexican government may
have had an incentive to delay the release of bad news.
Sequence of Events
Our model has two agents: a lender and a country.
7 The
lender in our model makes two decisions. First, it decides
whether to make a loan to the country. We assume that the
lender can get a safe, or risk-free, return of Rf > 0 else-
where. Moreover, competition among lenders ensures that
a lender will only make a loan to the country if it receives
an ex ante return of Rf. Second, the lender can decide to
liquidate the project at an intermediate date. This later de-
cision is made with the goal of maximizing expected re-
turns. At the time the loan is made, both the lender and the
country believe that theproject will succeed with probabil-
ity q,0<q<1 .
We assume that the country is risk averse and seeks to
maximize expected utility. The country takes the proceeds
from the loan it receives and invests them in a risky proj-
ect with a ﬁxed size. Over the course of the period, the
country learns whether or not the project will succeed. The
only decision the country makes is whether or not to dis-
close this information to the lender.
For simplicity, we assume that project quality is limited
to two extremes: good or bad. Good projects, if com-
pleted, yield an output of x. Bad projects, if completed,
yield an output of zero. We assume that the country can
disclose good news if it observes good news, can disclose
bad news if it observes bad news, or can choose not to
disclose. Even if the country decides to disclose its infor-
mation, logistical delays may prevent the lender from re-
ceiving this information.
Chart 2 shows the sequence of events for the lender and
the country. At the beginning of the period, the lender
transfers one unit of resources to the country. The country
then invests the resources in a risky project. On the report-
ing date, the country observes either good news or bad
news about the project. At this point, the country decides
whether to disclose this information to the lender. Whether
ornotthecountrymakesadisclosure,logisticaldelaysmay
occur, and if they do, the lender receives no news. The
probability of logistical delay, p, is assumed to be indepen-
dent of the success or failure of the project as well as of the
country’sdisclosuredecision.Basedontheinformationthe
lender receives on the reporting date, it decides whether or
not to liquidate the project immediately. If the project is
liquidated, the lender receives the liquidation value, L, of
the project and the country receives nothing. This liquida-
tion value is independent of the quality of the ﬁnished
project. If the project is not liquidated, then it is completed.
Uponcompletion,goodprojectsyield xunits ofoutputand
the country repays R to the lender. In this case, the coun-
try’s consumption is x − R. Bad projects that are not liqui-
dated by the lender are assumed to be liquidated by the
country, which consumes L, the liquidation value, and re-
pays nothing to the lender. We assume that the liquidation
value is small relative to the potential of the project. (That
is, L < x.) The accompanying table shows how the prob-
ability of project success interacts with the probability of
logistical delay and the country’s disclosure decision.
Equilibrium
Next we outline our notion of equilibrium. We ﬁrst deﬁne
the strategies of the country and the lender. We then de-
ﬁne the conditions necessary for the strategies to constitute
an equilibrium.
A strategy is a complete plan that prescribes the ac-
tions the country (or the lender) will take as a function of
what it observes. The country observes either good news
or bad news about its investment project. The country’s
strategy speciﬁes what disclosure, if any, it will make to
the lender in either of these contingencies. The lender re-
ceives the disclosure made by the country or observes the
fact that there is no disclosure, and it then chooses wheth-
er or not to liquidate the project. Thus, the lender may re-
ceive good news, bad news, or no news. Recall that when
the lender receives no news, delay can be either logistical
or strategic. The lender’s liquidation strategy speciﬁes, for
each of these three events, whether or not it will liquidate
the project.
A country’s disclosure strategy speciﬁes the report the
country will make when it observes good news or bad
news. Not all disclosure strategies are feasible, since the
country cannot claim that it has observed good news when
it actually observed bad news, or vice versa, but it can al-ways delay by disclosing nothing. Thus, when the country
observes good news, it may either disclose good news or
disclose nothing. When the country observes bad news, it
may either disclose bad news or disclose nothing.
An equilibrium is a return, R
*, a disclosure strategy for
the country, D
*, and a liquidation strategy for the lender,
l














* is such that the lender’s expected
returns from lending to the country equal Rf.
The ﬁrst two conditions ensure that each agent’s strategy
is a best response to the other agent’s strategy.
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Strategic Delay
Now we show that strategic delay in disclosing bad news
can be supported as an equilibrium for a wide range of pa-
rameters. The properties of the equilibrium vary, depend-
ing on the parameters. We identify two cases. The main
differencebetween the two cases is the liquidation strategy
followed by the lender. In the ﬁrst case, liquidation never
occurs in equilibrium. The project is so potentially proﬁt-
able that the lender does not liquidate the project even if
the disclosure of news about the project is delayed. In the
secondcase,liquidationoccursinequilibriumifthedisclo-
sure of news about the project is delayed. Here the project
is not as potentially proﬁtable as in the ﬁrst case.
Case 1: Equilibrium With Strategic Delay
and No Liquidation
Remark. Suppose that
(1) [p/(pq+1−q)]Rf > L.
Then the equilibrium has these strategies:
1. If the country observes good news, it discloses the
good news. Otherwise, it discloses nothing.
2. If the lender receives bad news, it always liquidates
the project. Otherwise, it never liquidates the project.
Noteﬁrst thatthe countryis weakly betteroff following
strategy 1 than any other strategy if the lender is following
strategy 2. To see this, note that if the lender is following
strategy 2, then the country receives nothing by disclosing
bad news, since that disclosure will trigger liquidation of
the project. Therefore, the country is always better off dis-
closing nothing if it observes bad news.
Before we can compare the lender’s expected returns
from alternative strategies, we have to ﬁrst calculate the
probabilities of the various outcomes conditional on the
country following strategy 1.
If the country follows strategy 1 and the lender receives
good news, then the lender knows for sure that the project
will succeed.
If the country follows strategy 1, then events G and H
in the table will never occur because the country will al-
ways delay disclosing bad news. Events A and B will nev-
er occur because the country will always disclose good
news. Thus, if the lender receives no news, then event C,
E, or F must have occurred. The probability that the proj-
ect will succeed when the lender receives no news is the
ratio of the probability of event C, pq, to the sum of the
probabilities of events C, E, and F, which are, respective-
ly, pq, p(1−q), and (1−p)(1−q). Thus, as shown in the ta-
ble, the lender believes that the conditional probability of
the project’s success if the lender receives no news is
(2) pq/(pq+1−q).
Having deﬁnedthe conditionalprobabilities forthe var-
ious events, we can now evaluate the returns for alterna-
tive actions by the lender. If the country is following strat-
egy 1, then the lender’s optimal strategy is not to liquidate
when it receives good news, since R
* > L. If the lender’s
expected return from not liquidating is greater than its ben-
eﬁt from liquidating, then not liquidating is also the lend-




To verify this assertion, we need to determine the value
of R
*. Since the lender receives nothing when the project
news is bad and there is no liquidation in equilibrium, the
only time the lender is paid anything is when the country
observes good news. Thus, the lender’s expected return
from the project is Rf = (1−q)0 + qR
*, and the equilibri-
um value of R is given by R
* = Rf/q. When we substitute
the value of R
* into (3), we ﬁnd that [pq/(pq+1−q)]R
* =
[p/(pq+1−q)]Rf, which is greater than L by assumption.
This substitution establishes that the lender will indeed
prefer not to liquidate when the lender receives no news.
We have thus shown that the pair of strategies described
in Case 1 does indeed constitute an equilibrium.
Case 2: Equilibrium With Strategic Delay
and Liquidation
Remark. Suppose that
(4) [p/(pq+1−q)]Rf < L.
Then the equilibrium has these strategies:
1. If the country observes good news, it discloses the
good news. Otherwise, it discloses nothing.
2. If the lender receives no news or bad news, it al-
ways liquidates the project. However, if the lender
receives good news, it does not liquidate the project.
As we noted above, the country always discloses noth-
ing when it observes bad news. The country also strictly
prefersto disclose goodnews to avoid liquidation, because
x > L. Therefore, the lender receives no news only if the
countryobservesbadnewsandchoosestostrategicallyde-
lay disclosing it or if there is a logistical delay. In Case 2,
delayed disclosure of bad news does not deter liquidation.
Consider next the lender’s strategy 2. If the country is
following strategy 1, then the lender’s optimal strategy is
to never liquidate the project when it receives good news.
As shown in the table, if the lender receives no news, the
lender believes that the conditional probability of the proj-
ect’s success is again
(5) pq/(pq+1−q).For the lender’s liquidation strategy to be a best response
to the country’s disclosure strategy, the lender’s beneﬁts
from liquidating the project when it receives no news must




so the lender always liquidates when it receives no news.
However, we need to know the value of R
* before we can
verify that condition (6) holds.
The value of R
* must be such that the expected ex ante
return to the lender in equilibrium is the risk-free rate Rf.
If the country observes good news, it discloses it truthful-
ly. The lender sees this disclosure with probability q(1−p)
and receives a return of R
*. If the country observes bad
news, it discloses nothing and the lender liquidates. If a lo-
gistical delay occurs and the lender receives no news, the
lender also liquidates. Liquidation yields L to the lender
and occurs with probability 1 − q(1−p)=1−q+p q . Thus,
the return to the lender is
(7) q(1−p)R
* + (1−q+pq)L = Rf
or
(8) R




=[p q /(pq+1−q)]{[Rf − L(pq+1−q)]/[q(1−p)]}
=[p /(1−p)]{[Rf/(pq+1−q)] − L}.
This expression is less than L if
(10) [p/(1−p)]{[Rf/(pq+1−q)] − L}<L
which can be shown to be equivalent to
(11) [p/(pq+1−q)]Rf < L.
Thus, the lenderindeed prefers to liquidate whenthe coun-
try does not disclose good news.
Notice that R
* is lower in this case than in Case 1. We
can also establish that the set of parameters in which Case
2 applies is disjoint from that in which Case 1 applies.
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Conclusion
In this article, we have documented a delay in the release
of Mexican international reserve data in the months before
Mexico’s debt crisis at the end of 1994. We have also pre-
sented a model which demonstrates that the country may
have had an incentive to delay the disclosure of bad ﬁnan-
cial news.
If we now compare the results of the model with the
facts described earlier, we see two reasons to think that
Case 1 is more relevant to the Mexican crisis. One is that,
in the wake of NAFTA, investors thought potential proﬁts
from investing in Mexico were large. In the language of
our model, the returns on a good project were high. The
other reason to think that Case 1 applies here is that the
delays we documented were not followed by a large im-
mediatedropinforeigninvestment:investorsdidnotliqui-
date. We cannot say that the Mexican government’s delays
in releasing data were strategic. However, our model ex-
plains why Mexico might have delayed the release of bad
news without triggering a liquidation: investors may not
have been able to distinguish between logistical and strate-
gic delay in the release of information about an investment
with a high expected return.
Besides the issue of delay we have focused on here, the
Mexican ﬁnancial crisis raises some fascinating questions.
Among them: After the crisis, the Mexican government
changed its data reporting practices drastically; why? Was
this a change for the better? What actually caused the ﬁ-
nancial crisis? And how could it have been prevented? We
suspect that, as answers to these questions are sought, the
issue of delay in releasing bad ﬁnancial news will continue
to be of great importance.
*Also,AdjunctAssociateProfessorofAccountingandFinance,UniversityofMin-
nesota.
1See, for instance, Kraft 1984 for a detailed discussion of the problems Mexico
faced due to a shortage of international reserves in 1982.
2We are not suggesting here that the withdrawal of Carpizio’s resignation caused
the recovery of international reserves.
3Although the presidential election was held in August, it had no noticeable effect
on reserves.
4Mexico now reports its reserves weekly on the World Wide Web at http://
www.shcp.gob.mx/english/info/html/mex22b.html.
5For a more detailed analysis of published guesses of Mexican reserves in 1994,
see Gil-Díaz and Carstens 1996.
6All the statistics in this paragraph are from Torres and Vogel 1994.
7The model we consider is related to three previous studies. Grossman 1981 de-
scribes a set of conditions in which the lender can infer the country’s private informa-
tion. Dye 1985 and Jung and Kwon 1988 develop models in which the disclosure of
private information may be effectively delayed, but these models assume no conﬂict of
interest between the two parties.
8We say a best response rather than the best response to allow for ties.
9In the interest of brevity, we omit a discussion of parameterizations that lie on the
boundary between Cases 1 and 2. These parameterizations represent a knife-edge case
where pRf = L(pq+1−q).
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Chart 2
 
Sequence of Events in the Model
Beginning of the Period Reporting Date End of the Period
The country borrows from




The country invests in a
risky project.
The country observes good news or bad news.
The country makes its disclosure decision.
Logistical delays may occur with probability p.
The lender chooses whether or not to liquidate
the project for cash flow L.
If the project is continued,
it either succeeds (cash flow x)
or fails (cash flow 0). 
Interaction of Probabilities and Decisions in the Model
 
Country’s Information
Project Disclosure Logistical Lender
Outcome Decision Delay Receives Event




No (prob. 1–p) No News B
Good News Yes (prob. p) No News C
No (prob. 1–p) Good News D
Project Fails No News Yes (prob. p) No News E
(prob. 1–u)
No (prob. 1–p) No News F
Bad News Yes (prob. p) No News G
No (prob. 1–p) Bad News H